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VERMEER CAROLINA 'S, INC. V. WOOD/CHUCK
CHIPPER CORP.: SOUTH CAROLINA'S
SUBOPTIMAL APPROACH TO INDEMNITY CLAIMS
OF RETAILERS AGAINST MANUFACTURERS OF
DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS
I. INTRODUCrION
In the age of strict products liability, an injured plaintiff will commonly sue
the retailer who sold him the product, the distributor, the manufacturer, and
anyone else in the chain of distribution. Under Restatement of Torts Section
402A,' adopted by the South Carolina legislature as the Sellers of Defective
Products Act (Defective Products Act), all of these defendants are strictly liable
to the plaintiff for putting a defective product in the stream of commerce.2 The
multiplicity of defendants in such litigation presents problems for the judicial
system that may not be solved using traditional rules of liability. F or a
retailer or distributor who is innocent of fault under traditional principles of tort
law, yet held strictly liable for selling or distributing the defective product,
there are three possible remedies against the manufacturer of the product: (1)
indemnification under traditional principles, (2) indemnification by way of a
warranty action, and (3) contribution under the statute of the relevant
jurisdiction. This Note will attempt to examine several of the problems
confronting courts when trying to define the relationship between the
manufacturer and other defendants in products liability cases. This Note will
analyze the availability of the first option when a warranty action or
contribution claim is either unavailable or for tactical reasons is not pursued by
the retailer. The South Carolina Court of Appeals recently confronted such a
situation when it decided Vermeer Carolina's, Inc. v. Wood/Chuck Chipper
Corp.3 Part II of this Note summarizes the holding and reasoning of Vermeer
Carolina's, and Part H analyzes the holding and reasoning of South Carolina
cases in light of products liability policies, suggesting an alternative course by
outlining the development of the law from a national perspective.
I. VERMEER CAROLINA 'S, INC. V. WOOD/CHUCK CHIPPER CORP.
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
2. See S.C. CODEANN. § 15-73-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
3. 336 S.C. 53, 518 S.E.2d 301 (Ct. App. 1999).
1033
1
T.: Vermeer Carolina's, Inc. v. Wood/Chuck Chipper Corp.: South Carol
Published by Scholar Commons, 2000
1 SouTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In Vermeer Carolina's, Inc. an individual, Causey, was injured by a wood
chipper manufactured by Wood/Chuck Chipper Corporation (Wood/Chuck).4
Causey acquired the product from Vermeer Carolina's, Inc. (Vermeer) in a
used condition.' After the chipper amputated his right arm, Causey filed an
action against Vermeer pleading breach of express and implied warranties,
negligence, and strict liability.6 Causey plead negligent design and strict
liability against Wood/Chuck.7
Causey asked that Wood/Chuck be dismissed with prejudice, and the court
granted the motion against Vermeer's objection.8 Vermeer failed to appeal this
order, and thereafter settled with Causey.9 Vermeer then filed an action seeking
indemnification or, in the alternative, contribution from Wood/Chuck for the
money paid in settlement to Causey.' Wood/Chuck moved for summary
judgment, and the motion was granted by the circuit court."
The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court order and
held that because a retailer of a product is strictly liable by virtue of selling a
defective product, that retailer is not entitled to indemnification." The court
further held that a retailer is not entitled to receive contribution from a
manufacturer who has previously settled because the manufacturer's previous
settlement extinguished the manufacturer's liability, thus destroying the
commonality of liability required for contribution. 3
In analyzing Vermeer's claim for indemnification, the court of appeals
identified three elements which the indemnitee must prove: "(1) the indemnitor
was liable for causing the Plaintiffs damages; (2) the indemnitee was
exonerated from any liability for those damages; and (3) the indemnitee
suffered damages as a result of the Plaintiff's claims against it which were
eventually proven to be the fault of the indemnitor."' 4 In applying this test, the
court relied principally upon two earlier cases: Scott v. Fruehauf Corp.'5 and
Stuck v. Pioneer Logging Machinery, Inc. " The court of appeals found that
these two cases stand for the simple principle that "there can be no indemnity
among mere joint tortfeasors" in strict liability. 7
The court of appeals offered Stuck as an example of a case in which
indemnification is appropriate in a strict liability context, and the court
4. Id. at 57, 518 S.E.2d at 304.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 58, 518 S.E.2d at 304.
7. Id. at 57-58, 518 S.E.2d at 304.
8. Id. at 58, 518 S.E.2d at 304.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 57-58, 518 S.E.2d at 304.
12. Id. at 67, 518 S.E.2d at 309.
13. Id. at 68, 518 S.E.2d at 309-10.
14. Id. at 63, 518 S.E.2d at 307.
15. 302 S.C. 364, 396 S.E.2d 354 (1990).
16. 279 S.C. 22,301 S.E.2d 552 (1983).
17. Vermeer, 336 S.C. at 64, 518 S.E.2d at 307.
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distinguished the facts of Vermeer from those of Stuck. 8 In Stuck the
indemnitee bought a vehicle from the indernnitor for use in its business. 9 The
truck proved to be defective, and killed another driver.20 The buyer settled
claims brought by the other driver and sought indemnification from the seller.2'
Thus, Stuck presented a situation in which the indemnitee was not a reseller of
the product, but a consumer. The indemnitor was not the manufacturer, but the
seller. The supreme court allowed indemnification, reasoning that the parties
were not joint tortfeasors because the injured party's claim sounded in
negligence, while the indemnification claim sounded in strict tort and
contract.' In essence, the supreme court distinguished the duties that each party
breached. Because the character of each party's duty to the injured party was
different, the court concluded that the parties were not joint tortfeasors.' The
purchaser owed a duty to the other driver to exercise reasonable care in
inspecting for and discovering defects in the vehicle, while the seller was
strictly liable for selling the vehicle in a defective condition.' Therefore, the
purchaser's claim againstthe sellerwas independent of the grounds upon which
the other driver was entitled to recover.' In Vermeer the court of appeals relied
upon the analysis inStuckto demonstrate that Vermeer and Wood/Chuck owed
the same duty to Causey, holding they were both strictly liable for putting a
defective product into the stream of commerce. 6
In analyzing the legal relationship that exists between parties both liable
under a theory of strict liability, the court of appeals relied upon Scott v.
Fruehauf Corp.7 In Scott the manufacturer had already settled with the
plaintiff, and the dispute over indemnification was between two parties in the
chain of distribution.2' The retailer was seeking indemnification from a
distributor who had refurbished and sold a product.29 The distributor and
retailer were successive sellers and were both strictly liable for selling a
defective product. 0 The court in Scott relied upon Promaulayko v. Amtorg
Trading Corp.,3' in which the New Jersey Appellate Division held "common
law indemnification does not apply among joint tortfeasors in strict liability. 32
18. Id. at 66-67, 518 S.E.2d at 308-09.
19. Id. at 23, 301 S.E.2d at 552.
20. Stuck, 279 S.C. at 23, 301 S.E.2d at 553.
21. Id. at 24-25, 301 S.E.2d at 554.




26. Vermeer, 336 S.C. at67, 518 S.E.2d at 309.
27. 302 S.C. 364, 396 S.E.2d 354 (1990).
28. Id. at 367, 396 S.E.2d at 356.
29. Id.
30. Id.. at 371, 396 S.E.2d at 358.
31. 540 A.2d 893 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988).
32. Scott, 302 S.C. at 371, 396 S.E.2d at 358.
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In Promaulayko the intermediate New Jersey court held that indemnification
was not available to a broker against his supplier.33
In Vermeer the court of appeals used Stuck to demonstrate that
indemnification is available to the purchaser of the product because the strict
liability that governs the seller's relationship with the purchaser is independent
of any liability the purchaser may have to an injured third party.34 After
discussing Stuck, the court of appeals presented Scott as a counterpoint to
Stuck. Whereas the indemnitor and indenitee in Stuck were liable under
different theories, in Scott both parties were strictly liable under the Defective
Products Act.35 Applying Scott to the relationship existing between Vermeer,
Wood/Chuck and Causey, the court of appeals concluded:
Absent a contractual provision whereby the upstream
manufacturer agreed to indemnify the downstream retailer,
the retailer cannot escape liability and, at the same time,
prove the manufacturer negligently designed or manufactured
a product. Vermeer did not show there was a genuine issue of
material fact that Vermeer was not ajoint tortfeasor, but was
the innocent defendant entitled to indemnification from
Wood/Chuck.36
III. ANALYSIS
A. Three Types of Cases, Two Types of Defendants
The fountainhead of modem strict products liability law is Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co. 37 Justice Traynor authored a concurring opinion in this
manufacturing defect case which presaged the strict liability movement. While
the majority relied upon the traditional tort principle of res ipsa loquitur,38
Justice Traynor advocated strict liability as opposed to negligence as a means
for holding the manufacturer liable.39 More importantly, Traynor expressed the
fundamental premise upon which strict product liability doctrine would
develop:
Even if there is no negligence, however, public policy
demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most
effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in
33. Promaulayko, 540 A.2d at 895-96.
34. Vermeer, 336 S.C. at 65-66, 518 S.E.2d at 308.
35. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
36. Vermeer, 336 S.C. at 67, 518 S.E.2d at 309.
37. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
38. Id. at440.
39. Id. at 441-42 (Traynor, J., concurring).
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defective products that reach the market. It is evident that the
manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard against
the recurrence of others, as the public cannot.'
The policy goal of placing liability upon the party that can most efficiently
prevent injuries has become the touchstone of both strict product liability law
in general and the law of indemnification specifically."
As a preliminary matter it should be noted that Stuck, Scott, and Vermeer
represent three distinct types of cases, and the policy implications of each type
are different and important to recognize. First, Stuck represents the simple
situation in which a purchaser is seeking indemnification from a manufacturer
for injuries to a third party for which the purchaser was held liable.42 Only the
indemnitor is subject to strict products liability, and the policies that urge strict
liability for defective products also urge indemnification on the same theory.
Whether the indemnitor is a manufacturer or a retailer, the South Carolina
General Assembly has determined in the Defective Products Act that one who
sells an unreasonably dangerous product is subject to liability for the injuries
caused by the product.43
Scott and Vermeer present situations more complicated than the situation in
Stuck, and implicate two different sets of policy questions. In Scott the party
seeking indemnification was a lessor, essentially in the same position as a
retailer, and the party against whom indemnification was sought was a
distributor." Thus, both parties were intermediate members of the chain of
distribution. In Vermeer an intermediate member of the distributional chain was
seeking indemnification from the manufacturer, the initial link in the chain of
distribution.45 The policy questions implicated by these distinct factual settings
revolve around a single idea that flows throughout tort law generally and strict
products law specifically. The social loss, either by compensation or denial of
compensation, should be imposed upon whichever party to a transaction is in
the best position to avoid the loss."
While South Carolina's courts may not be in the habit of speaking in terms
of efficient allocation of social loss, the idea is inherent in the language of cases
such as Stuck. 7 Notably, the supreme court in Stuck wrote of indemnification
in the following terms, reflecting a concern for allocating social loss efficiently:
We note the modem trend concerning the right to indemnity
is to look to principles of equity. According to equitable
40. Id. at 440-41 (Traynor, J., concurring).
41. See RcHARDA. POSNER, ECONOMICANALYSISOFLAW 179-83,197-99 (5th ed. 1998).
42. 279 S.C. at 24-25, 301 S.E.2d at 553.
43. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
44. Scott, 302 S.C. at 371, 396 S.E.2d at 358.
45. Vermeer, 336 S.C. at 58, 518 S.E.2d at 304.
46. See POSNER, supra note 41, at 179-83.
47. See 279 S.C. 22, 301 S.E.2d 553.
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principles, a right of indemnity exists whenever the relation
between the parties is such that either in law or in equity there
is an obligation on one party to indemnify the other, as where
one person is exposed to liability by the wrongful act of
another in which he does not join.48
The emphasis of this language is on what "act" exposed, the party seeking
indemnification to liability. 9 Further, the court of appeals in Vermeer stated
that "the most important requirement for the finding of equitable indemnity is
that the party seeking to be indemnified is adjudged without fault and the
indemnifying party is the one at fault."' This proposition reflects the idea that
social loss should be allocated to the party who may avoid the loss at the lowest
cost. A finding of fault is itself a judgment that a party was in a position to
prevent a loss and failed to do so. The purpose of equitable indemnification is
to protect an "innocent" defendant when the act of a wrongdoer exposes her to
liability.5 Thus, the emphasis throughout these cases is to impose the loss on
the party at fault and to protect the more innocent parties.
It is clear from the language of these cases that the concept of fault plays an
important role in determining whether one is entitled to indemnification.
However, it is equally clear that the concept of fault plays no role in
determining a seller's liability for selling a defective product. The Defective
Products Act sets out a seller's liability for a defective product as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) The seller is engaged in the business of selling
such a product, and
(b) It is expected to and does reach the user or
consumer without substantial change in the
condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) shall apply although
(a) The seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product, and
48. 279 S.C. at 24, 301 S.E.2d at 553 (emphasis added) (citing 41 AM. Jut. 2D Indemnity
§ 2 (1968) and 42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 21 (1994)).
49. Id.
50. Vermeer, 336 S.C. at 63, 518 S.E.2d at 307 (citing Addy v. Bolton, 257 S.C. 28, 183
S.E.2d 708 (1971); Town of Winnsboro v. Wiedeman-Singleton, Inc., 303 S.C. 52,398 S.E.2d
500 (Ct. App. 1990), aft'd, 307 S.C. 128,414 S.E.2d 118 (1992)).
51. See Addy at 28, 183 S.E.2d at 708.
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TORT LAW
(b) The user or consumer has not bought the
product from or entered into any contractual
relation with the seller.-
2
Subsection (2)(a) is explicit in its statement that a seller may be liable without
being at fault, and it is equally clear that this section is intended to define only
the legal relationship that obtains between sellers and consumers. There is no
reference to the relation that exists between parties within the chain of
distribution. These observations about the role of fault in determinations of
liability and indemnification are essential to a proper understanding of the
distinction between the three types of cases with which this Note is concerned.
As to those cases in which one party is acting in the role of ultimate
consumer, such as Stuck, the legislature has already made the necessary
decision. The Defective Products Act reflects the legislature's judgment that
between a consumer and any party in the chain of distribution, the proper way
to allocate the loss is to impose it on the party distributing the product." In
Vermeer, between Causey, Vermeer, and Wood/Chuck, the loss is properly
allocated to Vermeer and Wood/Chuck. The statute clearly prefers consumers
over all classes of sellers but does not indicate any preference between classes
of sellers. Thus, it is silent as to the dispute between Vermeer and
Wood/Chuck.
While the statute may not express a preference about liability between
classes of sellers, it is relevant in determining liability in cases of the second
two types, such as Scott and Vermeer. Two elements of the statute are crucial
to the determination of disputes between parties within the chain of
distribution. First, the statute requires that the product be "unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer" in order for there to be any liability at all.
5 4
Second, it incorporates the previously discussed provision in subsection (2)(a),
which states that a seller may be liable despite "exercis[ing] all possible care."55
Though purported to be strict liability, the first of these elements requires
courts to engage in a negligence-type analysis "balancing expected accident
costs against the costs of making the product safer." 6 The statute requires the
court to determine whether or not the design and manufacture of the product
are reasonable. Thus, subsection (1) introduces a concept of fault into the
analysis of liability for defective products. What distinguishes this concept of
fault from others is that the injured party does not have to prove the negligence
of each defendant to prevail against that defendant. Rather, the defect is carried
52. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976)
53. Id.
54. Id. § 15-73-10(1).
55. Id. § 15-73-10(2)(a).
56. PosNER, supra note41, at 197(citing Comment, Strict Products Liability and the Risk-
Utility Test for Design Defects: An Economic Analysis, 84 COLUM. L. R'y. 2045 (1984)).
57. . Id. § 15-73-10(1).
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by the product, and liability for the defect attaches to each seller in the chain
of distribution.
The second element in subsection (2)(a) furthers the policy of consumer
protection by allowing injured consumers to collect compensation even from
those in the chain of distribution that act with "all possible care,"58 a standard
certainly higher than reasonable care. Taken together, these provisions
effectively ensure that parties injured by defective products are compensated,
but a policy ensuring compensation does not necessarily provide an efficient
level of deterrence. However, the Defective Products Act does provide two
categories of defendants that are useful in formulating an effective deterrent.
First are those defendants that are liable despite exercising "all possible care,"
or perhaps reasonable care. Second are the defendants that acted unreasonably
in the manufacture or design of the product because presumably an
unreasonably dangerous product cannot exist without unreasonable action.
In turning to the final two types of cases, these categories of defendants are
the key to efficient resolution of the disputes. First, let us consider the Scott
situation in which the dispute is between two intermediate members of the
chain of distribution. 9 The facts in Scott are not typical of this class of cases
because the distributor in Scott refurbished the product before selling it to the
retailer;' thus the product may have been unreasonably dangerous because of
the refurbishing work performed by the distributor. In the typical case of a
retailer versus a middleman, the only difference between the two is that the
middleman deals in a greater volume of the product than the retailer.
Application of the two categories of defendants to such a case should identify
both as being innocent of fault, although they would both be liable to the
consumer. Between the two, neither contributed to the product being
unreasonably dangerous, and neither was in a better position to prevent the
defect.6' The situation presented is essentially an alternative-care case in which
neither of the defendants could have avoided the accident at a lower cost than
the other, at least not by direct control over the manufacturing process.6" Thus,
because neither party was at fault, indemnity may not be appropriate.
The third type of case, as exemplified by Vermeer, presents both categories
of defendants. The retailer that sells the product is innocent as to fault, though
liable to the consumer under the statute despite taking all reasonable
precautions. The manufacturer, on the other hand, is responsible for the
"unreasonably dangerous" character of the product. Again, this situation is an
alternative-care case, but in this situation there is little question that the
58. Id. § 15-73-10(2)(a).
59. Scott, 302 S.C. at 367, 396 S.E.2d at 356.
60. Id.
61. There is a persuasive argument that the distributor is in a better position to prevent the
defect than the retailer, and thus retailers have been allowed to obtain indemnification from their
distributors. Promaulayko v. Johns Manville Sales Corp., 562 A.2d 202 (N.J. 1989).
62. Scott, 302 S.C. at 367, 396 S.E.2d at 356.
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manufacturer who controls the processes of design and production can avoid
the social loss of injury at a lower cost than the retailer. In the words of Judge
Posner:
In an alternative-care case we do not want both tortfeasors to
take precautions; we want the lower-cost accident avoider to
do so. The liability of the other is a backstop in case
insolvency prevents the threat of tort liability from deterring
the primary accident avoider. Hence the need for a
mechanism that will, where possible, shift the ultimate
liability to the most efficient accident avoider; indemnity does
this.
6 3
By forcing a retailer such as Vermeer to absorb a portion of the loss, the
incentive for Wood/Chuck to design and manufacture safe products becomes
less than optimal. The court of appeals was correct in its conclusion that both
parties are strictly liable to the consumer for his injury, but the idea that liability
is the equivalent of fault for the purposes of determining a right to indemnity
was misguided.
B. The Proper Course: A National Perspective and the Proposed
Restatement (Third) of Torts
In Scott the supreme court cited an opinion of the New Jersey Appellate
Division for the proposition that "common law indemnification does not apply
among joint tortfeasors in strict liability."' Promaulayko demonstrated the
second type of case, pitting two intermediate members of the chain of
distribution against one another, and thus it was properly analogous to Scott.
Promaulayko presented a broker of asbestos material seeking indemnification
from his supplier, and the intermediate New Jersey court held that the broker
was not entitled to indemnification. 65 The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed
the appellate division, reasoning that the distributor was more capable of
exerting pressure on the manufacturer than the broker." The New Jersey
Supreme Court's opinion in Promaulayko presents a good argument that
indemnification should be allowed even between intermediate members of the
chain of distribution so long as the indemnitee is lower in the chain than the
indemnitor.6 Moreover, by allowing indemnification in the most marginal type
63. POSNER, supra note 41, at 207.
64. Scott, 302 S.C. at 371, 396 S.E.2d at 358.
65. Promaulayko v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 540 A.2d 893, 894,897 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1988).
66. Promaulayko, 562 A.2d at 207.
67. See id. at 206.
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of case, the court made it clear that indemnity would be available to retailers
and distributors against the manufacturer."
In California, it is clear that retailers and distributors are entitled to
indemnity from the manufacturer of the defective product even if the
manufacturer has already settled with the plaintiff. InAngelus Associates Corp.
v. Neonex Leisure Products, Inc.69 the California Court of Appeals reasoned
that under a theory of strict products liability, all parties in the chain of
distribution are liable to the plaintiff, although they may not be responsible for
the defect that was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.7" The court
further reasoned that parties not responsible for the defect proximately causing
the injury are entitled to complete indemnification from the responsible party.7 '
California has also confronted a case all parties had settled with the injured
party, leaving the dispute in question between the distributor and the
manufacturer-Huizar v. Abex Corp.72 Huizar used reasoning similar to that in
Angelus, holding that despite settlement by all parties, the distributor may be
entitled to indemnification so long as the finder of fact finds no active
negligence.73 The court opined that under traditional principles, a retailer
without fault is entitled to total indemnification when a manufacturing or
design defect subjects the retailer to liability for injuries to a third party.74
Indemnification has long been the rule in New York in disputes between
manufacturers and distributors. The seminal New York case is Ruping v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,75 in which a retailer sought indemnification from
the manufacturer and the bottler of an exploding soft drink.76 The court held
that the retailer was entitled to indemnification so long as there was no showing
of independent negligence on the part of the retailer in storing or displaying the
bottle.77 This holding is consistent with optimal deterrence because it places
liability only upon those parties that could have controlled the conduct which
caused the injury.
The continuing vitality of this approach in New York is clear as stated in
section 64 of New York Jurisprudence: "[A] right of indemnity has been
implied between a manufacturer and distributor, as between a distributor and
purchaser... . Thus, New York treats indemnification between strictly liable
68. See id.
69. 213 Cal. Rptr. 403 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
70. Id. at 404 (citing Vandermart v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1964)).
71. Id. (citing Davis v. Air Technical Indus., Inc., 582 P.2d 1010 (Cal. 1978)).
72. 203 Cal. Rptr. 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
73. Id. at 50-51.
74. Id. at 50.
75. 126 N.Y.S.2d 687 (N.Y. App. Div. 1953).
76. Id. at 688-89.
77. Id. at 689-90.
78. 23 N.Y. JUR. 2D Contribution, Indemnity, and Subrogation § 64 (1982 & Supp. 1999).
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tortfeasors in the same way it treats indemnification in cases of vicarious
liability by looking to fault rather than liability.79
These New Jersey, California, and New York cases represent a national
trend that is also reflected in the proposals by the American Law Institute for
the Restatement (Third) of Torts. The Proposed Final Draft provides:
(a) If two or more tortfeasors are or may be liable to a
plaintiff for the same harm and one of them discharges the
liability of the others by settlement or discharge ofjudgment,
the tortfeasor discharging the liability is entitled to recover
indemnity in the amount paid to the plaintiff, plus reasonable
legal expenses, to secure the discharge if-
(1) the indemnitor has agreed by contract to indemnify the
indemnitee, or
(2) the indemnitee
(i) was not liable except vicariously for the
tort of the indemnitor, or
(ii) was not liable except as a seller of a
product supplied to the indemnritee by the
indemnitor and the indemnitee was not
independently culpable.
(b) A person who is otherwise entitled to recover indemnity
pursuant to contract may do so even if the party against
whom indemnity is sought is not liable to the plaintiff.8"
On its face, the rule may not protect retailers when manufacturers settle first
because the rule appears to require the indemnitee to discharge the liability of
the party from whom it seeks indemnification. However, Comment c provides:
"An indemnitor is not protected from indemnity, however, by a settlement with
or other voluntary discharge of liability by the plaintiff."81 This rule would
prevent many of the fights over indemnification resulting from single party
settlements.
While there may be some limitations on the face of the rule, such as the
requirement that the indemnitee be supplied by the indemnitor, the rule
effectively distinguishes between the two categories of defendants. It places the
ultimate liability where the defect and the resulting injury may be most
efficiently controlled - on the defendant responsible for the defect that
proximately caused the injury. South Carolina should adopt this rule for two
reasons. First, it does not in any way diminish the rights of injured consumers
to receive compensation from whichever defendant in the chain of distribution
79. Id.
80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 31 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1998).
81. Id. § 31 cmt. c.
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is most amenable to suit. Second, this rule provides a more efficient system of
deterrence for manufacturers than the system reflected in Vermeer.
IV. CONCLUSION
The holding and reasoning in Vermeer is misguided because it fails to
provide optimal incentives for the manufacture and design of safe products.
Moreover, the supreme court's analysis in Scott does not require that a party
such as Vermeer be denied indemnification from the manufacturer. Scott's
holding was made in the context of two intermediate members in the chain of
distribution, and an application of Scott to a dispute between a retailer and
manufacturer is an expansion of the holding in Scott. South Carolina's courts
should reconsider the availability of indemnification to retailers, understanding
that the concept of strict liability controls the relationship between sellers and
consumers, and that the strict liability concept is not useful in defining the
relationship between retailers, distributors, and manufacturers.
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